In this retrospective study, we revisit the twin Greek Parliamentary elections of May and June 2012 and the Presidential election that led to the dissolution of the Parliament in December 2014. Apart from their political impact at European-wide level, these elections provide a unique political field experiment for the application of power indices and their interpretation in context. We model three different Parliament configurations as weighted majority games and utilize available software to evaluate the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf (normalized and absolute), Deegan-Packel, Public Good (Holler) and when applicable the Myerson, Owen and Coleman's indices. By comparing the indices evaluations with the actual events, our findings have twofold implications. On a context specific level, we identify discrepancies between parliamentary seat share and formal power of each party. In this way, we understand parties' motives and strategic considerations that offer an alternative perspective to existing political analyses. On a methodological level, we are able to comment on the predictive and explanatory quality of the various power indices at least in this case-specific context. Finally, we discuss constitutional problems that emerge in the dichotomous voting processes at the enhanced majority of 60% stipulated by the Greek Constitution and propose necessary policy amendments.
Introduction
The political events that took place in Greece in 2012, see Dinas and Rori [2013] , Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013] attracted widespread international attention. Having signed two loan agreements -Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) -to avoid bailout, Greece was facing severe economic problems and public unrest. The MoUs carried harsh austerity measures that were deemed necessary at the moment to ensure Greece's stay in the Euro-zone. In this environment of political instability, uncertainty about the future and social protests, Greece went to early elections in May 2012. In a new cleavage that transcended the traditional left-right division, the electorate was divided between friends and opponents of the MoUs. Due to further fragmentation of the electorate's preferences in parties of the two camps, the elections couldn't produce a majority government. Negotiations for a coalitional government between the 7 parties that gained parliamentary representation soon led to a deadlock and new elections were called for June 2012. This time and under both domestic and international pressure for a stable outcome, the negotiations led to a three-party coalitional goverment. However, it proved fragile and short-lived. Only 1.5 year later, the coalitional government -already reduced to two parties -had to ensure a 60% enhanced majority in the Parliament to elect the President of the Republic in a dichotomous "yes-no" process. Failing to do so, the parliament was dissolved and new elections were called for January 2015.
In this paper, we adopt a game-theoretic approach to re-analyze these events. The motivation for our retrospective study is twofold. From a political perspective, the events of the 2012-2014 period in Greece pose an interest that transcends the Greek political life and is still active at a European and international level. A broad existing literature has shed light to different aspects of the electorate's behavior and the parties' strategic decisions, see Dinas and Rori [2013] , Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013] , Teperoglou and Tsatsanis [2014] and Nezi [2012] , Koliastasis [2015] , Matakos and Xefteris [2016] and Tsirbas [2016] . The present paper aims to complement these findings by adopting a quantitative perspective and utilizing the mathematical tools for the measurement of voting power. From a purely scientific/ game-theoretic perspective, these elections constitute a rare field experiment for the application and comparison of power indices. The reasons are manifold. The elections were conducted in a very short period (within 6 weeks) under very similar circumstances. In both elections, the same 7 parties managed to enter the Parliament, albeit with different seat shares. The short period between the May and June elections implies that differences in voting between can be attributed to voters' strategic considerations rather than in change of their preferences. Neither election could produce a majority government and extensive negotiations for the formation of coalitional governments took place. Finally, the Parliament that was formed after the conclusive June 2012 elections had to elect the President of the Republic at the enhanced 60% majority. This dichotomous "yes-no" election, that took place in December 2014 provides a third case study with the same parties but most importanlty at a different quota. In sum, there are three major instances, two coalition formation processes at the simple 50% majority and one dichotomous voting procedure at the enhanced 60% majority that all together provide a scientific opportunity for the application, comparison and study of power indices in context.
Methodology & Findings
Before we proceed with our findings, we stress that the present study intends to complement rather than substitute a formal political analysis. All findings are better interpreted in the specific political context, which we provide below.
In view of the lack of consensus on the right index, see Holler and Nurmi [2013, 2014] , Holler and Owen [2001] , we employ the standard approach of calculating the most common indices and interpreting them with different criteria, see Lane and Maeland [1995] , Leech [2002] and Alonso-Meijide et al. [2011] among others. We represent three different instances -May 2012, June 2012 and December 2014 -of the Greek Parliament as weighted majority games, see Leech [2002] , Alonso-Meijide et al. [2008] , Zuckerman et al. [2012] , Alonso-Meijide et al. [2013] and evaluate the ShapleyShubik, Penrose Banzhaf, Deegan-Packel and Public Good (Holler) indices for the 50% majority and additionally the Coleman's indices to initiate and to prevent action for the 60% majority. Calculations are performed with the freely available AL.EX4 and ipdirect software 1 . When available, we draw from the parties' political agendas, public commitments towards potential coalitions and the actual events to establish connections between parties and a-priori unions and to evaluate the Myerson and Owen indices respectively.
To summarize our findings, we very briefly present the political context of the 2012 elections. For a detailed exposition see Section 3. In both elections, 7 parties gained parliamentary representation. These were -from left to right -KKE, The Greek communist party, SYRIZA, The Coalition of Radical Left, DIMAR, Dimocratic Left, PASOK, Panhellenic Socialist Movement, ND, New Democracy, ANEL, Independent Greeks and GD, Golden Dawn. KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL and GD were against the implementation of the MoU with agendas of various intensity, whereas ND and PASOK were pro Memorandum. DIMAR was a central political actor with neutral stance. SYRIZA and ANEL had left open the prospect of cooperation (in case SYRIZA had won the elections), while KKE and GD had excluded their participationfor different reasons each -in any potential government. ND won the elections with SYRIZA being the main opposition party. Far below the required 50% majority of parliamentary seats, ND formed a proto-coalition with PASOK and negotiated with DIMAR to form a government. At that point, DIMAR refused to enter the government and second elections were called. Our findings for the May 6 Parliamentary elections, can be summarized as follows:
1. The Shapley-Shubik index, interpreted as a measure of P-Power, indicates disproportionally large share of spoils only for the dominant party of the governing coalition, ND, compared to its actual seat share. This explains that the coalition may have been perceived as unfair by the potential smaller partners and sheds some light on their refusal to participate. 2. The Deegan-Packel and Holler indices -taking into account only minimal winning coalitions -reveal a disproportionally high influence of smaller parties. As several smaller parties entered the Parliament, this indicates an exaggerated fragmentation of political power and further explains the reasons that led to the deadlock. More importantly, it provides an incentive for strategic voting to voters who prioritize governmental stability over choosing their favorite party. 3. The Myerson index turns out to be the right tool to capture the strategic advantage of DIMAR due to its moderate stance and connectivity with all parties. The same is achieved by the Owen index, which attributes to DIMAR a value equal to three-times its parliamentary seat share.
In the June elections, and under more polarized conditions, ND raised its vote share by 10% and won again the elections 1 Source: AL.EX4 and ipdirect. See also Section 8.1.
by a short but clear margin from SYRIZA. This time the negotiations were conclusive and a coalitional government formed between ND, PASOK and DIMAR. Our findings for the June 12 Parliamentary elections, are the following:
1. All indices point to the strategic disadvantage of the main opposition party, SYRIZA, when it comes to coalition formation. However, this inflates the power of small parties and thwarts the prospect of a broad cooperative government between the two main parties, ND and SYRIZA. 2. As ND increased its vote share and following PASOK's May agreement to become a partner with ND, the negotiation power of smaller parties reduced. In particular, DIMAR abolished its strategic advantage since already ND and PASOK achieved the required 50% majority. Once again, these considerations are accurately captured by the Myerson and Owen indices and shed light on the eventual fate of DIMAR in the governing coalition.
The government was short-lived. Soon thereafter and under constant friction between its members, DIMAR abandoned the governing coalition. The remaining partners, ND and PASOK, had to ensure a parliamentary majority of 60% (or equivalently 180 Members of the Parliament (MP) ) in the Presidential elections of December 2014 to remain in power.
The Presidential Election was a dichotomous process were each MP voted either "Yes" or "No" for a single candidate. The governing parties failed to reach the required majority and Greece was led to early elections in January 2015, in which the currently incumbent government of SYRIZA and ANEL was formed. Our findings for the December 2014 Presidential elections, are the following:
1. There is a significant distortion of power at the current 60% majority that is stipulated by the Greek Constitution for important decisions (such as Presidential Election or Constitution Amendment). 2. The presence of anti-systemic parties in the Parliament significantly compromised the outcome of the dichotomous voting process, since these parties unavoidable aligned in either the "yes" or usually the "no" camp with other parties of very different political ideology.
Based on these findings, we discuss the problem of the right quota and address the question of whether a fair supermajority exists. Following the suggestion of Leech [2002] , we compare the absolute Banzhaf index and the Coleman's indices for different quotas, and find that the 70% enhanced majority exhibits better qualities. While it is impossible to argue that this is the correct majority -as our conclusions are peculiar to the seat distribution of 2012 and 2014 -our findings indicate that at least in one significant case, the enhanced majority that is stipulated by the Greek Constitution resulted in distortion of power and uneven representation of public preferences in the parliamentary decision making process.
Outline
The rest of the paper is structures as follows. In Section 2, we provide the mathematical definitions of cooperative games, weighted voting games and power indices. In Section 3, we briefly discuss the political and socio-economic background of Greece before the twin elections of 2012. Sections 4 and 5 contain the main results of our analysis, in which we describe the actual events of the May and June elections respectively, evaluate the power indices and provide their interpretation in the specific political context. In Section 6, we present our analysis of the December 2014, Presidential election and in Section 7, we discuss the issue of a fair enhanced majority for parliamentary decisions of constitutional importance. In Section 8, we summarize our conclusions and discuss prospects for further study.
Mathematical Preliminaries
In an effort to make the paper self-contained, this section is devoted to the mathematical background of cooperative games, weighted majority games and voting indices. Since the focus is on the interpretation of power indices in the specific context of the Greek elections, a reader may skip this section without significantly compromising the understanding of the paper. The exposition and notation are considered standard and largely follow Leech [2002] , Alonso-Meijide et al. [2008] , Zuckerman et al. [2012] , Alonso-Meijide et al. [2013] and Bertini and Stach [2015] .
Cooperative Games
A transferable utility or cooperative game G = (N, v) is given by a finite set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a function v : 2
Function v is called the characteristic function of the game G and is used to denote G.
Any subset S ⊆ N is a coalition. The set of all possible coalitions corresponds to the powerset 2 N of N, where ∅ denotes the empty coalition. By s we denote the number of members in S , i.e., s := |S | for any S ⊆ N. A transferable utility game G is simple if
A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be winning if v (S ) = 1, and losing otherwise. A simple game v is completely determined by either the set of winning coalitions W = {S ⊆ N : v (S ) = 1} or the set of minimal winning coalitions M := {S ∈ W : T ⊂ S =⇒ T W}. Accordingly, for each player i ∈ N, the sets of winning and minimal winning coalitions that contain player i are denoted by W i := {S ∈ W : i ∈ S } and M i := {S ∈ M : i ∈ S }. A player i ∈ N is called pivotal or crucial for a coalition S ⊆ N \ {i} if v (S ∪ {i}) = 1 and v (S ) = 0. For each i ∈ N, let η i denote the set of all coalitions S for which player i is crucial, i.e., η i := {S ∈ W : S \ {i} W}, and for each 1 ≤ s ≤ n, let η s i denote the subset of such coalitions with cardinality s, i.e., η s i = {S ∈ η i : |S | = s}. Every coalition S ∈ η i is called a swing for player i. Note that in a minimal winning coalition S ∈ M, every player i ∈ S is crucial. A player i is called a dummy player if she does not contribute to any coalition, i.e., if v (S ) = v (S ∪ {i}) for all S ⊆ N.
Weighted Voting Games
A voting body can be thought of as a weighted voting game, G = [q; w 1 , . . . , w n ], where G is a simple game, w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ R n + a vector of nonnegative real weights, and q ∈ R + a nonnegative quota with the following decision rule: a coalition S is winning, v (S ) = 1, if and only if its total weight, w (S ) := ∑ i∈S w i , meets or exceeds the quota, i.e.,
∑ i∈N w i < q ≤ ∑ i∈N w i , then G is also called a weighted majority game. Let WVG (N) denote the set of all weighted voting games with N players. When discussing weighted voting games in the present setting, we use the terms "players", "parties" and "voters" interchangeably. In a weighted voting game, a player j is crucial for a coalition S ⊆ N \ { j} if w (S ) < q and w j + w (S ) ≥ q. Holler and Owen [2001] posit that most parliaments of Western Democracy in fact operate as weighted voting systems, given the strong links of of individual members to party factions and factions to coalitions. According to our assumptions, any game considered here is proper, i.e., a game in which the complement N \ {S } of any winning coalition S is necessarily losing. This excludes the possibility of having two contradictory decisions, i.e., two simultaneously winning coalitions. However, it is possible that for some coalition S , both S and N \ {S } are losing. In this case, S is called a blocking coalition, i.e., a blocking coalition is a coalition S such that both S and N \ {S } are losing.
Power Indices
In the present paper, all applications can be thought of as weighted voting games. Hence, we will henceforth restrict the definitions to games G = [q; w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ] ∈ WVG (N). A power index is a map ψ : WVG (N) → R n . To simplify notation, we will write ψ i instead of ψ i (G). For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the non-negative real number ψ i is interpreted as the power of the corresponding player i ∈ N in game G. In general, a power index is a numerical measure that estimates the a-priori capacity or influence (or capacity of being decisive) of each player/party in a weighted voting game, Bertini and Stach [2015] .
Shapley-Shubik index
The Shapley-Shubik index, Shapley and Shubik [1954] , assigns to every player i ∈ N the real number
It is interpreted as a measure of Power as Prize (P-Power), and is meant to be a voter's (party's) expected payoff -as a percentage -from entering a winning coalition, Dubey and Shapley [1979] , Felsenthal and Machover [1998] .
Penrose-Banzhaf index
The Absolute Banzhaf or non-normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index 2 , Penrose [1946] and Banzhaf [1965] , assigns to every player i ∈ N the real number
that is equal to the ratio of the number of swings for player i, to the total number of non-empty coalitions. It is interpreted as a measure of Power as Influence (I-Power), see Felsenthal and Machover [1998] . The normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index, is given by β
and has the property that all of its components sum up to 1.
Deegan-Packel index
Deegan and Packel [1978] suggested that only minimal winning coalitions should be considered in establishing the power of a voter. Accordingly, they proposed the Deegan-Packel index, which assigns to every player i ∈ N the real number
that is equal to the sum of the inverse size of all minimal winning coalitions containing player i, divided by the total number of minimal winning coalitions. Here, M
An axiomatization and discussion of its properties can be found in Lorenzo-Freire et al. [2007] .
Holler (PGI) index
The Holler or Public Good index (PGI), Holler [1982] and Holler and Packel [1983] , assigns to every player i ∈ N the real number
that is equal to the total number of minimal winning coalitions containing player i, divided by the sum of all minimal coalitions for all players j ∈ N. The PGI differs from the Banzhaf index inasmuch as only minimum winning coalitions are considered, see Lorenzo-Freire et al. [2007] .
Coleman's indices
Coleman [1971] proposes two indices two measure the power of each player to prevent and to initiate action respectively. The power of player i to initiate action is defined as the number of swings relative to the total number of voting outcomes that do not have a winning coalition and is defined as
The C I index measures the potential of i to swing a coalition from losing to winning. The power of a member to prevent action, Coleman [1971] , is a measure of its ability to block a decision by means of a swing. It is the proportion of outcomes with winning coalitions that are also swings for player i, and therefore represents the capacity of i to change a winning vote into a losing one. It is defined as
Connections between parties & Myerson index
To study situations with already existing connections between parties Myerson [1977] introduced the following index, which became known as the Myerson index. Given a cooperative game G = (N, v), the characteristic function for the Myerson index is given by
, otherwise where, T ∈ S /E is a subset of the connected elements of S according to the set of connections E. Then, the Myerson index is the SS-index computed using the game G ′ = (N, v E ) defined by the characteristic function v E , see Myerson [1977] , Fernández et al. [2002] .
A-priori unions & Owen index
For a given set of parties N and set of a-priori unions K = {U 1 , . . . , U k } between them, the Owen index, Owen [1977, 1982] , for party i that belongs to union U j is given by
where H is a subset of the a-priori unions set K which does not contain union U j , h is the number of a-priori unions in H, k is the number of a-priori unions in K, S is a subset of parties of the union U j which contains party i, s is the number of parties in S , t j is the number of parties in U j and v is the characteristic function as described above. The default is that each party is in a separated union, in which case the Owen index reduces to the Shapley-Shubik index.
Historical background
Since the restoration of the democracy in 1974, the Greek party system has been a typical example of two-partyism with the centre, centre-left PASOK and the centre-right ND alternating in government. It has been characterized by stable, single-party majority governments of these two dominant parties, largely due to the disproportional electoral system which assigns a bonus of seats to the first party, called reinforced proportional representation. As such, the Greek political practice lacks a history and culture of consensus and communication, Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013] , Dimitrakopoulos [2015] and coalitions have been rare and short-lived, Nezi [2012] .
Socio-economic circumstances prior to the 2012 twin elections
The economic problems of Greece were severely exacerbated by the global economic crisis of 2008. Suffering from hardly sustainable debts, unemployment and corruption in the public sector, Greece signed between 2010 and 2012 two Memorandums with its creditors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) to avoid bailout. The Memorandums were proposals of economic transforms that carried unpopular, severe austerity measures. Public unrest, widespread protests and fear about the future dominated the Greek political and social scene prior to the 2012 elections. At that point, the Greek economic crisis attracted international attention. The incumbent party, PASOK, having spent more than 20 years in government since 1974, was held as the main responsible for both the circumstances that led to this crisis as well as for the handling of the crisis itself. Under severe pressure, PASOK was decompositing. Its voters were moving to adjacent parties, mainly on the left of PASOK, that were promising to punish the ruling elite and cancel the loan agreements. ND, as the second most prominent party of the past, was suffering from similar problems but to a lesser extent. In this tumult, anti-establishment, populist parties and parties with extreme positions were gaining power.
Electoral rule
The electoral system in effect during both the 6 May and 12 June elections was a reinforced proportional representation system, a form of semi-proportional representation with a majority bonus: the party that wins a plurality of votes cast is awarded an extra 50 seats (out of a total of 300 parliamentary seats). The remaining 250 seats are divided proportionally according to each party's total valid vote percentage. Small parties need to reach an electoral threshold of 3% in order to be represented in parliament. This system helps the party that wins a plurality to achieve an absolute majority (151 out of 300 parliamentary seats). It effectively enhanced governmental stability in the Greek bipartisan political system that up to 2009 saw the percentage of the two dominant parties, PASOK and ND, often exceed 85% of the total vote. The premium of 50 parliamentary seats is received primarily at the expense of the second-place party, Patrikios and Karyotis [2008] . Also, according to the electoral system, the ability of the first party to form a single-party government depends on the total percentage of the parties not entering the parliament, Koliastasis [2015] : the fewer parties entering the parliament, the easier it would be for the winning party to govern on its own. For symbolic reasons, voting remains compulsory although no formal sanctions apply to non-voters. Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected for four-year terms in the seat legislature (Vouli ton Ellinon).
Parties & political system in 2012
The twin 2012 elections signalled a radical change in the Greek political scene. The electoral results pointed to a transition from the stable two-party system to a fragmented political system with more uniformly distributed power among several parties, thus confirming the electorate's switch to coalitional governments.
The debate prior to the May 2012 elections mainly focused on the issue of implementing or cancelling the harsh measures that were stipulated by the Memorandums. The traditional left-right cleavage, that had served as a safe predictor of the Greek public's voting preferences, gave its place to a new demarcation line between friends and opponents of the Memorandums, Dimitrakopoulos [2015] . The electorate was angry to punish the ruling elite and was prepared to abandon the traditional two-partyism in favor of a less strategic and more uniform distribution of preferences. The pro-Memorandum camp was represented by the traditional parties of ND and PASOK. The anti-Memorandum camp was more popular, however its power was fragmented and distributed among several parties with different ideology and agenda. The main positions and characteristics of the parties that gained parliamentary representation in both the May 2012 and June 2012 elections are presented in Table 1 below. The electoral results are presented in the next section.
Political Parties
Main positions -characteristics
KKE

Communist Party of Greece
Anti-capitalist, anti-european and anti-Memorandum, communist party. Although, publicly declined any cooperation with other parties, a considerable part of its electorate was willing to vote for SYRIZA to exploit the historical opportunity of electing a left government in Greece.
SYRIZA
Coalition of the Radical Left
Main anti-Memorandum option attracting most votes from the dissolving PASOK and taking its place in the centre-left political spectrum as the second main electoral force and main opponent of the centre-right ND. SYRIZA embodied the historical opportunity to unite left forces and form the first leftist government in Greece. Initially a radical left, anti-systemic ideology that subsequently was suitably adjusted to attract both radical left and modest, centre-left voters that were leaving PASOK. Punishment of ex-political elite. Contradictory (albeit popular) agenda, balancing unrealistic promises to abandon rescue plans and Memorandums and pragmatic plans to avoid Euro-exit. Open to a coalition mainly with ANEL.
DIMAR
Democratic Left
Moderate pro-European opposition to the Memorandum. Central political actor with neutral positions and acceptable public image, willing to become a coalition partner to any pro-Euro coalitional government.
PASOK
Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Mainstream centre, centre-left. 
GD
Golden Dawn
Extreme right-wing, anti-systemic, anti-parliamentary, xenophobic and nationalistic party. Punishment of rulling political elite, hard stance against refugees and extreme anti-bailout positions.
Refusing any cooperation with other parties. Rising popularity. The connection between KKE and SYRIZA represents the proximity between voters of both parties rather than the official disposition of the two parties towards a potential coalition. While SYRIZA was initially open to a cooperation with KKE, the communist party excluded any the possibility of participating in a potential government with SYRIZA. However, in the June elections, half of the KKE voters eventually moved to SYRIZA.
The May 06, 2012 Parliamentary elections
The elections took place in a background of severe uncertainty, electoral volatility and popular discontent, Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013] . The former dominant parties PASOK and ND were dissipating (especially PASOK) and many new parties were gaining ground. The results of the May 06, 2012 elections are presented in tary representation. The results signaled the end of two-partyism in Greece and pointed to a more uniform distribution of voter's preferences. The electoral rule could not handle the result as it was designed to assist the formation of majority governments in a clear two-party system. Coalition formation was a necessity. ND and PASOK quickly agreed to form a coalition and DIMAR was the main candidate to complete the government. SYRIZA and ANEL sooner or later made it clear that they could not cooperate with the former rulling elite and dropped from the negotiations. KKE and GD unequivocally excluded their participation in any potential government. In the end, DIMAR refused to cooperate, polarized circumstances dominated and the discussions about a coalition government soon led to a stalemate. New elections were called.
Measuring a-priori power: the classic indices
Our aim is to use power indices to derive a different perspective on the strategic decisions of the parties that led to the deadlock in the negotiations that followed the May 06, 2012 elections. The Greek Parliament after the May 06, 2012 election can be described as the weighted voting game [151; 108, 52, 41, 33, 26, 21, 19] .
The 151 seats correspond to simple majority, q = 50%. Table 4 shows the values of the main power indices that we employ in the current analysis. For more clarity, the Shapley-Shubik and Deegan-Packel indices are also depicted graphically -along with the parliamentary seat share of the parties -in Figure 3 . Our main findings are twofold. First, the Shapley-Shubik (SS) index captures well the distribution of power of all parties except of the winning party, ND.
Interpreted as a measure of P-Power, the SS index shows that ND anticipates an inflated share on the potential spoils from forming a government. ND's SS-index is equal to 46% compared to its seat share of 36%. This discrepancy constitutes a detterent to other parties to cooperate with ND in a potential government. The normalized Banzhaf index provides very similar results. Second, the Deegan-Packel (DP) index -an index that considers only minimum winning coalitions, and thus seems more appropriate in the present setting -captures the disproportionally high power that is attributed to the smaller parties. The deviation from the gained seat-shares results to an uneven representation of the public's preferences in the formation of govenrment and provides voters with an incentive to vote strategically for major parties (parties that are likely to win the elections), despite the fact that they might prefer a smaller party. Similar conclusions can be drawn if we consider the Holler index. Finally, the absolute Banzhaf index captures the power of each party to influence the outcome of the negotiations and its interpretation is straightforward when compared with the actual seat shares of the parties.
Connections between parties and Myerson index
Based on the connectivity graph Figure 1 , we can calculate the Myerson index, which is given in Table 5 index draws only from the a-priori information that is provided via the parties' public statements about their willingness to negotiate. The results are revealing and capture well the real power of the different parties in the negotiations. The two leading parties, ND and SYRIZA, have an index close to their actual seat share. GD in not connected to any other party and hence it has the role of a dummy player in the negotiations. On the other extreme, KKE is only connected -as mentioned above only implicitly -with the neighboring SYRIZA and hence its power is less that its actual seat share. Yet, the most striking feature of the Myerson index is that it captures the negotiation power of the most versatile -in terms of connections -party, namely DIMAR. Indeed, having a moderate stance, practically open to both left and right partners, DIMAR sees its power under the Myerson index surge to 22%, compared to its mere 6.33% parliamentary seat share. The Myerson index captures both DIMAR's versatility in the negotiations and its necessity for the formation of a coalitional government. A similar conlusion can be drawn for PASOK. However, since PASOK excluded a coalition with SYRIZA, whereas DIMAR did not, its Myerson index is less inflated than DIMAR's.
A-priori unions and Owen index: incentives & gradual coalition formations
Finally, to capture the dynamic nature of the coalition formation process, we study the Owen index with varying apriori unions. The methodology of reevaluating power after intermediate rounds of proto-coalition formation, has been persuasively utilized by Lane and Maeland [1995] , to assess power within the former EU voting bodies.
In the actual events that followed the May 06, 2012 elections, ND and PASOK swiftly agreed to cooperate in a potential government. Thus, when DIMAR was asked to participate in the government, a proto-coalition between ND and PASOK already existed. In Table 6 , we estimate the power of each party -with the focus being on ND, PASOK and DIMAR as the main candidates to form the coalitional government -taking different a priori unions in account. The first line assumes no such proto-coalition and corresponds to the Shapley-Shubik index. The second line, with ND-DIMAR as a-priori union, is hypothetical and is presented for comparison reasons. The third line corresponds to the actual protocoalition that formed after the first day of negotiations. Finally, the last line corresponds to the potential winning coalition of ND-PASOK-DIMAR and indicates the division of spoils between them, in the event that they would had agreed on forming a government. The main findings from the Owen index concern the incentives of parties to enter an existing coalition or not. Both parties PASOK and DIMAR are in a better position to enter the coalition with ND first, but are less motivated once the other has already entered the coalition. However, no matter the order in which they enter the coalition, the final distribution, as given in the last line, shows that both DIMAR and PASOK are expecting a higher share of spoils than their actual seat share. In particular, while DIMAR contributes a mere 6.33% of seats, which is equal to the 100% · 6.33/(6.33 + 13.67 + 36) = 11.3% of the total power of the winning coalition, according to the Owen index, DIMAR expects a 17% of the spoils. In the actual course of events, DIMAR denied to enter the coalition.
The June 12, 2012 Parliamentary elections
After the May deadlock, Greece headed for a second election, scheduled on June 12, 2012. The political parties asked the electorate to vote more strategically and concentrate their preferences on the main parties. The campaign took place under severe social and economic problems, extreme uncertainty and volatility and increasing external and domestic pressure to produce an outcome that would enable government formation, Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013] , Dinas and Rori [2013] , Dimitrakopoulos [2015] . The pro-/anti-Memorandum cleavage was exacerbated to reflect also the dilemma whether Greece should stay under any circumstances in the Eurozone or not. The dominant parties, ND and SYRIZA, reverted to more polarized rhetoric. Concerning their disposition against coalition formation, KKE and GD confirmed their denial to take part in any form of negotiations and excluded the possibility of cooperating. SYRIZA became the main delegate of the anti-Memorandum camp and hardened its stance against the pro-Memorandum parties of ND, PASOK and to a lesser extent DIMAR. Its agenda about remaining in the Eurozone was confusing. During the campaign, both SYRIZA on the radical left and ANEL on the populist right, declared their willingness to cooperate in an anti-Memorandum coalitional government. On the other hand, ND and PASOK stressed the necessity of forming a stable pro-Memorandum government and asked the electorate to provide them with a clear mandate. Finally, DIMAR assumed again the role of a central political factor with moderate stance and focused its campaign on its role as a stabilising force in any potential governmnet that would form after the elections. The results of the June 12, 2012 elections are presented in Table 7 and Figure 4 . This time the negotiations were successful and led to the formation of a coalition government consisting of ND (129 seats), PASOK (33 seats) and DIMAR (17 seats) and enjoying a (seemingly) solid majority of 179 seats. It is worth mentioning that DIMAR is not crucial in this coalition. The configuration of the cabinet in August 2012, which did not correspond to the distribution of seats, was composed of 13 ministers from ND, two nominated by PASOK and two nominated by DIMAR. The difference between the assignment of ministers and the actual distribution of seats, as observed by Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou [2013] , is confirmed by the evaluation of power indices, see Table 8 . In reality, the governing coalition proved fragile and short-lived and after short time the problems began, Koliastasis [2015] . The a priori evaluation of the indices might have given some hints about the problematic nature of this coalition. The unfair distribution of the spoils, as documented by the SS-index, may have been a reason for unrest and dissatisfaction within the minor parties, especially DIMAR, that formed this coalition. Constant friction led to the withdrawal of DIMAR from the government in June 2013, leaving ND and PASOK with a slim majority of 153 seats. The fragility of the governmental coalition was ultimately confirmed at the Presidential Election of December 2014 which led to the dissolution of the Parliament and to a new round of twin elections in 2015. This issue is discussed in Section 6.
Measuring a-priori power: the classic indices
The Greek Parliament after the June 12, 2012 election can be described as the weighted voting game [151; 129, 71, 33, 20, 12, 18, 17] The corresponding a-priori power indices are given in Table 8 Packel (DP) indices are depicted graphically, along with the parties' parliamentary seat shares in Figure 5 . Compared to Section 4.1, our main findings are the following. First, the SS index shows a significant distortion of power -when compared with the actual parliamentary seat share -for the two leading parties, ND and SYRIZA. This distortion gives an accurate explanation for ND's advantage in forming a government (winning coalition). This distortion is also captured by the absolute Banzhaf index, which attributes a mere 10% to SYRIZA, despite SYRIZA's 26.67% percentage of seats. Second, when it comes to minimal winning coalition, both the Deegan-Packel and Holler indices show a remarkably uniform distribution of power with only a slight advantage for the leading ND. Quoting Holler and Nurmi [2014] : "This story tells us that it could well be that a larger player is not always welcome to form a winning coalition if a smaller one does the same job." It is worth noting, that the governing coalition that eventually formed between ND, PASOK and DIMAR was not minimal. Finally, the normalized Banzhaf index is very close to the Shapley-Shubik index. 
Connections between parties and Myerson index
Using the connectivity graph in Figure 1 , we calculate the Myerson index for the June 12, 2012 elections, which is given in Table 9 below. Again, the Myerson index provides some of the most interesting insights. Having no connections, GD remains a dummy player. KKE has lost a considerable part of its power, largely due to the movements of voters directly to SYRIZA. ND's index is remarkably close to its actual seat share. Still, the most striking feature of the Myerson index is that it captures the improvement in the strategic position of PASOK, despite the fact that PASOK lost a considerable amount of seats, when compared to the May elections. More importantly, the Myerson index shows how DIMAR abolishes its strategic advantage, despite retaining its voting share and its connections. Due to the rise in the voting share of ND and its connection with PASOK, DIMAR is not necessary anymore to the governing coalition and its negotiation power has been reduced. It is worth mentioning, that eventually DIMAR abandoned the governmnent 
A-priori unions and Owen index: gradual coalition formations
The loss of the strategic advantage of DIMAR is also accurately captured by the Owen index. As in Section 4.3, we calculate the Owen index for different a-priori unions that are given in the first column of Table 10 . As can be seen from the last row of Table 10 , DIMAR not being a swinger anymore for the ND-PASOK coalition, expects a mere 5% of the spoils from participating in a governing coalition compared to 17% after the May elections, when DIMAR was still crucial for the governing coalition. On the other hand, PASOK has considerably increased its power and enjoys an advantage compared to the May election. Finally, the Owen index is very accurate in capturing ND's actual contribution to the winning coalition. Indeed ND contributes 100 · 43/ (43 + 11 + 5.67) = 72% of seats of the winning coalition and has an Owen index of 70%. Hence, PASOK's advantage is solely in expense of DIMAR's power share. 
Governability
We conclude this discussion with the criterium of governability, Vito Fragnelli and Ortona [2005] , Ortona [2002] . MarieEdith Bissey and Ortona [2004] base their defition of the governability index g, see AL.EX4 software, on the general assumption that governability is inversely related to the number of parties in the governing coalition. Accordingly, they allow governability to depend primarily on the number of crucial parties of the governing coalition, i.e., those parties that destroy the majority if they withdraw -PASOK and ND but not DIMAR in the case of the June 2012 government formation -and secondarily on the number of seats of the majority. The index g is then composed by two components that are summed up lexicographically
where C is the total number of crucial parties in the governing coalition, n is the number of seats above the majority level of the governing coalition, and m the total number of seats in the parliament. The values of indices are between 0 and 1/2 with higher values corresponding to higher governability.
The governability index for the ND-PASOK-DIMAR coalition is found to be equal to 0.3642. This value is relatively high and indicates a relatively stable government. Indeed, despite the fact that DIMAR withdrew from the coalition the remaining parties retained the control of the parliamentary majority. Along with the significant distortion of power that the calculation of power indices revealed at the 60% level, we conclude that it was the enhanced majority of the 180 MPs and the Presidential election that proved detrimental for this government and not its fragility at the simple majority level. Remark: In the lack of consensus of the correct governability index, AL.EX4 software provides three more governability indices. The coalition government under scrutiny performed well in all four indices at the 50% majority.
The December 29, 2014 Presidential elections
The coalition of ND, PASOK and DIMAR that formed after the June 2012 elections was posed with a formidable challenge: they had to ensure a parliamentary majority of 180 out of 300 MPs to elect a new President of the Republic by December 2014. According to the Greek Constitution (Article 32), if such a majority is not formed, and a President is not elected, the parliament is immediately dissolved and early elections are called, Koliastasis [2015] . Then, the new parliament can elect the president with a simple majority of 151 out of 300 MPs. The incumbent government proposes a candidate and all 300 MPs engage in a dichotomous voting process. "Yes" suggests support to the candidate and implicitly a vote of confidence to the government, whereas "no" is used to express discontent to the government and points to the MP's (or party's) will for dissolution of the Parliament and early elections.
Based on the above and despite the ceremonial nature of this post, the Greek Constitution effectively gives a veto to a coalition of opposition parties if they can muster at least 121 (from a total of 300) votes, Tsirbas [2016] . This provided a boubtless test to the ruling coalition's stability, as Dimitrakopoulos [2015] correctly predicted, and ultimately gave the opportunity to the opposition to lead the country to early elections in 2015.
The final -and crucial -round of the Presidential elections took place in December 29, 2014. By then, DIMAR had abandoned the governing coalition and was itself in a state of dissolution. Additionally, some MPs from PASOK and ANEL and to a lesser extent from ND had abandoned their parties but retained their seats in the Parliament as independent MPs. What eventually happened is that the governing coalition ND-PASOK ensured the support of some independent MPs and reached a total of 168 "yes" votes, 12 short of the required majority. The remaining 132 MPs gathered in the "No" camp which comprised the whole parliamentary teams of SYRIZA and ANEL, the remnants of DIMAR and de facto the left and right extreme, anti-systemic parties, KKE and GD. As a consequence, early elections were called for January 2015. In these elections, SYRIZA, the main opposition party in the 2012 elections and main representative of the "No" camp in the Presidential election of 2014, won by a clear margin and formed a coalition government with ANEL, still in power as of 2018.
In what follows, we try to understand the distortions of power at this majority and the incentives of the parties to vote for continuation of the government or not. Moreover, our analysis reveals an instance of the uneven influence of extreme, anti-systemic parties in dichotomous voting procedures.
6.1 Measuring a-priori power at 60%: the classic indices
The Greek Presidential Election of December 29, 2014 can be described as the weighted voting game [180; 129, 71, 33, 20, 12, 18, 17] .
Note that these numbers reflect the distribution of power among the Greek parties at the June 12, 2012 elections and do not take into account the movements of MPs that took place until December 2014. Accordingly, the following analysis aims to understand the initial incentives and power considerations that shaped the parties' decisions prior to the Presidential election.
In Table 11 , we re-evaluate the power indices for the Greek Parliament that formed after the June 12, 2012 elections, but for the 60% majority. The voting procedure concerns a dichotomous decision, with "yes" corresponding to the election of the suggested ND-PASOK-candidate and hence to the continuation of the government and "no" corresponding to the rejection of the suggested ND-PASOK-candidate and the call of early elections (in the absence of an alternative candidate with enough support which was de facto excluded). The classic indices point to a significant distortion of power at the 60% majority. On the one hand, the Shapley-Shubik index indicates a very disproportionally large share of profits for the leading party, ND, in case that ND manages to win -pass a "Yes" vote -the elections. The constitutes a detterant for other parties to cooperate. On the other hand, the indices that consider only minimal winning coalitions, Deegan-Packel (DP) and Holler (PGI), point to the contrary direction. ND, has a disproportionally low power to form minimal winning coalitions. In all cases, the power of SYRIZA to influence the outcome of the election seems to be underestimated.
Power to prevent & initiate action at 60% majority: Coleman's indices
More revealing is the calculation of Coleman's indices to prevent and to initiate action. Recall, that the distinction of power to initiate and power to prevent an action only matters for bodies which employ a supermajority, here the 60% quote. In a simple majority wheighted game Coleman's indices are equal and equivalent to Banzhaf index. The results are given in Table 12 . A value of 1 corresponds to certainty that a party can initiate (or prevent respectively) some action. It is immediate from the second line of Table 12 , that ND's and PASOK's power to initiate action at 60% majority is far below 1. In contrast, SYRIZA has a disproportionally high power to prevent action. However, the most striking feature is the power of the right extremist party, GD, to prevent action. Such anti-systemic parties are pre-disposed against any action in the Parliament and de facto align with the "No" camp. This provides an a-priori advantage to the opposition parties, here SYRIZA and ANEL, to unite forces against a fragile government and to "undeliberately" form a blocking coaltion. The combined effect of theses considerations is a distortion of the result of the dichotomous voting process. Accordingly, the case of the Presidential Election of 2014 points to the need for further consideration of such processes and perhaps to the need for the provision of a third alternative to account for a different winning quota. 
The role of the extremes: the Owen index
The uneven role of the extreme parties is further pronounced when we consider the Owen index. The a-priori unions that are studied in the first column should not be interpreted as cooperation between parties in this context. SYRIZA did not cooperate with KKE nor with GD, but all three parties found themselves in the same camp with unwavering certainty to vote "No", albeit for very different reasons. For instance, while a cooperation between KKE (far left) and GD (extreme right) is excluded, the dichotomous voting finds them in the same camp. Similarly, SYRIZA and ANEL the main "No" delegates, find themselves connected with the anti-systemic parties, despite having fully contradictory agenda and ideology with them. In practice, the only parties that left some room for negotiation were the dissolving DIMAR and the more inclined to "No" -in anticipation of becoming a partner in a new coalitional government -ANEL. The results of the Owen index for different a-priori unions are given in a dummy, a very important indicator to the actual fate of the party. On the other hand, ANEL have a disproportionally high power and have assumed the role of the crucial political factor. It is surprising, that in the case in which ANEL are considered to have entered a-priori the "No"-camp (second line of that table), the power of the extreme, and de facto "No"-camp parties, KKE and GD is disproportionally increased. In this case the remaining "Yes" partner to ND, PASOK, becomes also a dummy. In sum, the evaluation of the power indices in the Presidential elections points to two major conclusions. First, there is a significant distortion of power in the 60% quota, that does not adequately reflect the parties seat shares in the Parliament and hence, the public's preferences. And second, and perhaps more important, ideologically disparate parties unavoidable align their forces to produce confusing electoral outcomes. These two points call for the need of rethinking the terms under which such dichotomous elections take place.
7 Distortion of power: Is there a fair majority?
The findings of the previous section suggest an institutional problem at the current enhanced majority of 60% or 180 MPs for important parliamentary decisions, at least for the specific case of the 2014 elections. To study the existence of a fair majority, we reevaluate the power-indices for several enhanced majorities. We use the absolute Banzhaf (PenroseBanzhaf) and Coleman's indices, as suggested by Leech [2002] , who further proposes that an analysis of the effect of changing the quota q requires consideration of absolute rather than relative voting power as the normalizing constant is affected by q. Also, when the decision rule requires a supermajority with the quota q > 0.5, it is important to measure the power to initiate an action or to prevent (block) an action. This is done with Coleman's Power of a Member to Initiate (CPI) an action index and Coleman's Power of a Member to Prevent (CPP) an action index, respectively. Starting from the majority of 50% we evaluate the aforementioned indices and repeate our analysis making increments of 5% in each repetition (with the exception of q = 67% that corresponds to 200 MPs).
Based on the Absolute Banzhaf index, we observe that the governing coalition (ND/PASOK) is losing power as the supermajority (q) increases 4 . At the same time, the second party (SYRIZA) gains more power until q = 75%. The power of the other parties varies non linearly. Since, in addition, the absolute power of the governing coalition is disproportionally high at q = 60% but almost equal to the main opposition party's power at q = 75% (and equal thereafter), a natural suggestion for a fair and more democratic decision body -especially for important decisions -is a supermajority around q = 70%. This suggestion is reinforced by CPI index. The government coalition's CPI is high at majorities 50% < q < 60% but almost equal to the second party's CPI for majorities of 75% or more. Hence, to have a decision body that can make decisions, the suggestion of using a quota around 70% seems rational.
The Absolute Banzhaf index, CPI index and CPP index for the governing coalition and the remaining parties are given in the first three panels of Figure 6 . The last panel (third row) of Figure 6 compares the governing coalition's (ND/PASOK) CPI index to the main opposition party's (SYRIZA) CPP index. While it is impossible to argue what this is the correct majority -as our conclusions are peculiar to the seat distribution of 2012 and 2014 -our findings provide a clear indication that at least in one significant case, the enhanced majority that is stipulated by the Greek Constitution resulted in a significant distortion of power and uneven representation of the public preferences in the parliamentary decision making processes.
Conclusions
We applied power indices methodology to revisit the twin Greek Parliamentary elections of May and June 2012 and the Presidential election that led to the dissolution of the Parliament in December 2014. We modeled the three different Parliament configurations as weighted majority games and evaluated the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf (normalized and absolute), Deegan-Packel, Public Good (Holler) and when applicable the Myerson, Owen and Coleman's indices of the various parties. Our findings complemented existing studies as they revealed discrepancies between parliamentary seat share and formal power of each party. In particular, we found that ND, the leading party, had a disproportionally high P-Power, thus dettering potential coalitional partners. In the coalition that eventually formed, ND had a similarly higher share spoils which may explain internal frictions and withdrawals of its partners. In addition, when it came to minimal winning coalitions, formal power seemed unevenly distributed to the smaller parties thus preventing the formation of a stable coalitional government. This revealed an incentive for voters to vote strategically for the more dominant parties in the second June elections.
Drawing from parties public statements' and political agendas, we established connections and a-priori unions to evaluate the Myerson and Owen indices. This indices accurately captured the inflated power share of the smaller but modest party, DIMAR, and their exaggerated expectations from the spoils. Additionally, they captured how DIMAR's strategic advantage was abolished once the dominant party, ND, increased its seat share in the June election, so that DIMAR was no longer crucial in the ND-PASOK protocoalition that had formed after the May elections. Finally, we studied the Presidential election at the enhanced 60% majority that was held by the same Parliament. All indices point to a significant distortion of power and to the uneven influence on the outcome of extreme, anti-systemic parties like GD. Based on these considerations, we studied different quotas to suggest policy improvements for the Greek Constitution. However, our recommendations in the case should be taken with caution as they are based on the case specific Parliament configuration under scrutiny. Teperoglou and Tsatsanis [2014] raise the discussion about the prospects of the greek political system. They suggest the -now confirmed -removal of the 50 seat bonus and argue in favor of a more proportional system to mitigate the pressure for strategic voting. Koliastasis [2015] maintains that voters are becoming increasingly favorable towards coalitional governments, thus abandoning the partisan extremism and ideological polarization of the past. Traditional predictors of voting behavior in Greece, such as ideology, Nezi [2012] , are starting to wane and give their place to new parameters, such as economic, retrospective or sociotropic voting criteria, Tsirbas [2016] . These findings raise two major issues for the Greek political scene in the near future:
Future Research
1. Which is the appropriate electoral rule for Greece? 2. How will parties form coalitions in the upcoming elections?
The failure of the political system to handle the May 2012 electoral result, provides credence to the radical opinion that the electoral system may be best chosen even after the vote, see Ortona [2002] . However, while this first question has a more theoretical flavor, the second is more subtle and more case specific. Does the new electoral rule -of simple proportionality -distribute power evenly? Or is it manipulable by certain -major or minor -parties? Will this system reduce or increase polarization once again? Does the 3% threshold fit to the new political reality? Will this new system prove satisfactorily in representing the actual public preferences? Tsirbas [2016] raises the issue of the shape of the party system, the number of parties and consequently, the concentration or fragmentation of political power. He remarks that the actual equilibrium that will result is still debatable and points to the need of further exploring the current movements. Mathematical tools can certainly aid the effort of political analysts to understand the fragmentations and reconfigurations that are taking place in the Greek political scene.
